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I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
Fay Gaw: Plaintiff/Appellant 
State of Utah, by and 
through its Dept. 
of Transportation: Defendant/Respondent 
Jimmy Wray Lingle: Defendant/Respondent 
Allstate Insurance 
Co., an Illinois 
corporation: Defendant/Respondent 
Roadrunner Trucking, 
a New Mexico 
corporation: Defendant/Respondent. 
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IV, 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellate jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2 (3)(j) and Article VIII Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
This is a negligence action. This appeal arises after a 
full jury trial in which judgment was granted for defendants. 
Other defendants were dismissed earlier on summary judgment. 
V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND ORDINANCES 
Article VIII Section 3, Utah Constitution 1 
Rule 30(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence 4, 8 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 ( 3 ) ( j ) 1 
1 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err by failing to receive testimony 
on the ultimate issue of the case? 
Did the trial court err by instructing the jury on per 
se negligence, as opposed to prima facia negligence? 
Did the trial court correctly dismiss the State of 
Utah? 
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury 
that a driver who enjoys the right of way still has a 
duty of due care? 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and appellant Fay Gaw (hereafter Gaw) was injured 
in a car/truck collision. She was paralyzed from the waist down. 
(R. 510.) 
The truck was driven by defendant Jimmy Wray Lingle. 
(Hereafter Lingle.) (R. 510.) The truck was owned and operated 
by defendant Road Runner Trucking. (R. 509.) The incident 
occurred on a state highway. (R. 510.) 
Carbon County and the City of Helper were dismissed and no 
claim is made against them in this appeal. (R. 218, 387.) 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
State of Utah. (R. 1376.) At the time of trial, only three 
parties remained: the injured party (Gaw), the truck driver 
(Lingle), and Lingle's employer (Roadrunner Trucking). 
The jury returned a verdict allocating 75% negligence to 
plaintiff Gaw and 25% negligence to defendant Lingle. (R. 1671.) 
Gaw appeals. 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE 
An issue in the case was whether or not Gaw acted reasonably 
in turning left onto the highway. Gaw proffered expert testimony 
that the markings on the intersection were confusing, and that 
Gaw was misled or confused by the markings. The expert further 
testified that she acted reasonably as she attempted to follow 
the confusing signs. The trial court rejected that testimony on 
the grounds that an expert could not testify on an ultimate 
issue. However, the trial court failed to follow Rule 704, Utah 
Rules of Evidence which specifically states that an expert may 
testify on an ultimate issue. 
POINT TWO 
The trial court gave three instructions on per se 
negligence. That was clear error. The Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the doctrine of per se negligence. Rather 
Utah has adopted the doctrine of prima facia negligence. See 
e.g. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1984). 
POINT THREE 
The State of Utah designed the intersection where the 
accident occurred. There is testimony that the design was 
confusing and not up to design standards. Gaw gave deposition 
testimony that she was not confused. Based upon that deposition 
testimony, the State of Utah was granted summary judgment. 
However, the testimony on confusion was taken out of context. 
Gaw also testified in the same deposition that she was confused. 
Further, there was expert testimony that Gaw was confused. 
Finally, the simple fact is that people can be confused without 
realizing it. 
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POINT FOUR 
The trial court instructed the jury on the law of right of 
way. However, the Court erred by failing to instruct that the 
favored driver has a duty of due care even though he may have the 
right of way. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMTT 
GAW'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY ON THE ULTIMATE ISSUE 
A. PROFFERED TESTIMONY 
Gaw's expert testified in. chambers that: 
Mrs. Gaw was behaving in a way that she 
thought. . . was proper to behave in making 
the left turn. . . (Tr. 242, Lines 19-23.) 
The expert further clarified his scientific analysis of the 
accident: 
Well I avoid using the term prudent and 
negligent in regard to behavior, because 
those are legal terms of art. . . I have 
given my opinion with regard to the 
reasonableness of users of the roadway, not 
just these two individual users. (Tr. 256, 
Lines 14-20.) 
The human factors expert further testified that in view of 
all the factors, Mrs. Gaw's conduct was reasonable (Tr. 245, 
5 
Lines 1-6, 246, Lines 14-22), and the conduct of the truck 
driver (defendant Lingle) was not reasonable.1 (Tr. 252, Lines 
12-14.) If the truck driver's conduct had been reasonable, the 
accident could have been avoided, or at least greatly reduced in 
impact. (Tr. 253, Lines 7-10.) 
B. QUALIFICATIONS OF GAW'S EXPERT 
Gaw's expert was a human factors research scientist. 
Human factors research is a joint activity betwe€m engineers and 
behavioral scientists. The purpose of human factors research is 
to design systems in the environment that are compatible with 
human limitations. Over fifty universities grant degrees in 
human factors. (Tr. 230, Lines 17-21.) 
A classic example of the need for human factors scientists 
was the World War II battleship. At that time, gun turrets would 
crush the crew if allowed to turn to its maximum extent. (Tr. 
231, Lines 5-9.) In other words, the machinery did not fit the 
human being. 
Plaintiff's expert specializes in human factors as applied 
to highway transportation. (Tr. 232, Lines 8-25,) Specifically, 
his research has been involved one way or another in virtually 
all traffic control devices on the road today. (Tr. 232, Lines 
24-25.) That includes intersections (such as the one in this 
1
 The truck driver faiLed to reduce speed for a yellow 
blinking light. (Tr. 250, Lines 8-25; 251, Lines 1-14.) 
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case) where the traffic control devices are painted on the 
pavement. (Tr. 234, Lines 24-25; 235, Lines 8-25.) He has done 
research for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(Tr. 237, Lines 17-25), and he has been an advisor to the 
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for over 
twenty years. (Tr. 234, Lines 14-16.) This committee publishes a 
manual of standards which is adopted by virtually every state and 
the federal government. The manual is used by traffic engineers 
when they design roads and intersections. (Id.) 
C. COURTfS RULING 
The trial court cut the heart out of the proffered 
testimony. The trial court judge said: 
. . . [T]he determination of what reasonable, 
prudent conduct is under the legal term as 
explained to the jury is not an area that an 
expert can testify to. (Tr. 268, Lines 3-6.) 
However, the trial judge did grant "half-a-loaf". 
Specifically the court ruled that: 
. . . [W]e will allow the witness to. . . 
give his opinions on whether or not the 
markings could confuse. 
(Tr. 269, Lines 16-18. ) 
Still the expert was not permitted to testify as to the 
conduct of the truck driver, nor was he permitted to testify 
whether Mrs. Gaw's conduct was reasonable. 
7 
D. ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN FACTORS TESTIMONY 
Courts have routinely received expert testimony from human 
factors scientists: See e.g. Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 720 
P.2d 696 (Nev. 1986); Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 
381 
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1980); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 
530 (N.D. 1977); Scott v. Sears & Roebuck, 789 F.2d 1052 (4th 
Cir. 1986); Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 675 F.2d 
1185 (1982); Public Health Foundation, Etc. v. Cole, 352 So.2d 
877 (Fla.App. 1977). 
E. LEGAL BASIS FOR COURT RULING 
It appears that no one seriously questioned the 
expert's credentials. It also appears that there* was no serious 
issue as to whether the expert testimony might be helpful to the 
jury. (See Rule 702 "If. . . specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact. . . an expert may testify thereto. . .") 
Obviously his testimony was helpful. See e.g. United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd.Cir. 1985). See also 7 
Wigmore, Evidence, §1923 (Chadbourne Rev. 1978) 
Rather, the court was concerned that the expert should not 
testify on the ultimate issue of the case, viz. the 
reasonableness of the conduct of both drivers. (See Tr. 268, 
Lines 6-10.) 
The issue is covered by Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue. • . 
The jury was deprived of helpful testimony, on the 
reasonableness of the conduct of Gaw and Lingle. The failure to 
receive testimony on the ultimate issue invites misunderstanding 
and confusion in the jury's minds. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 
P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah 1979). 
In Collins By and Through Kay v. Seaboard, Etc., 675 F.2d 
1185 (11th Cir. 1982) the court noted that it would be "absurd" 
to suppose that human factors testimony would not be helpful in 
evaluating the dangers of a'complicated railroad crossing; and 
that an appeal attacking such expert testimony would be 
"frivolous". See also Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1980) . 
F. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for rejecting expert testimony 
is normally abuse of discretion. Shurtleft v. Jay Tuft & Co., 
622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
On the other hand, it appears that the trial court 
misunderstood the law. The trial court supposed that expert 
testimony could not be received on an ultimate issue. (See Tr. 
268, Lines 3-10.) If the court bases its conclusion on a 
misunderstanding of the law, discretion is abused. Wingert v. 
W.C.A.B., 468 A.2d 526, 528 (Pa. App. 1983); Schmid v. Olsen, 
330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Wise. 1983). 
9 
POINT TWO 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE 
INSTRUCTIONS ON PER SE NEGLIGENCE 
The Court gave three jury instructions on p€?r se negligence: 
Instruction No- 14^ deals with right of way. After 
explaining the law on right of way, the instruction concludes: 
Failure to yield the right of way under such 
circumstance is negligence. . . 
Instruction No. 17*3 deals with duties of a driver making a 
left hand turn. After stating the law on left hand turns, the 
instruction concludes: 
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance 
with the foregoing requirements of the law is 
negligence on the part of the driver. 
Instruction No. 18^ deals with a driver's duties where a 
barrier or median is painted on the pavement. The Court 
concluded the instruction by stating: 
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance 
with the foregoing requirements of the law is 
negligence on the part of the driver. . . 
A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INSTRUCTING JURY. 
This type of instruction is generally referred to as a 
per se instruction. That is to say negligence automatically 
folLows if the statute is violated. 
2
. See Exhibit A. (R. 1642.) 
3
. See Exhibit B. (R. 1645.) 
4
. See Exhibit C. (R. 1646.) 
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However, Utah has never adopted the per se rule.^ Rather, 
Utah courts have consistently followed a rule of prima facia 
negligence. See Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 395 P.2d 62, 
16 Utah 2d 30 (1964) and cases cited therein. 
The doctrine of prima facia negligence generally means that: 
Prima facia evidence. . . merely meets the 
minimum question of evidence necessary for a 
party to prevail if the evidence remains 
unrebutted. . . Once the trier of fact is 
faced with conflicting evidence it must 
weigh "the prima facia evidence with all of 
the other evidence presented." 
[all citations omitted.] 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.y 690 P.2d 541f 547 (Utah 1984). See 
also Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). 
Failure to correctly instruct the jury on prima facia 
negligence is prejudicial error. Intermountain Farmers 
Association v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1978). 
B. FACTUAL BASIS FOR INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
In this case, the truck driver, Lingle, put on evidence that 
Gaw was prima facia negligent by turning left onto the highway. 
Prima facia negligence means that her conduct, 
~>. In the trial court defendant Lingle relied on a series 
of California cases. California does follow the per se rule. 
See e^g^ Faqerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc., 2 36 Cal.Rep. 
633 (1987) . 
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. . . is subject to justification or excuse 
if the evidence is such that it could 
reasonably be found that the conduct wcis 
nevertheless within the standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances. 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 364 P.2d at 64. 
Assuming arguendo that there was evidence of prima facia 
negligence, there was still abundant evidence to show 
"justification or excuse." Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., supra. A 
brief sketch of the evidence on "justification or excuse" 
follows^: 
Gaw's expert was a human factors research scientist.^ The 
expert testified that the traffic intersection wcis very unusual. 
(Tr. 290, Line 24.)^ There was a high probability that Gaw was 
not aware of a safe manner of negotiating the intersection. (Tr. 
292, Lines 12-15.) In fact, Gaw only did what would have been 
typical for other drivers using the intersection.. (Tr. 297, Lines 
2-8.) Furthermore Gaw's conduct was reasonable in view of the 
confusing pavement markings. (Tr. 245, Lines 1-6; 246, Lines 14-
22. ) 
b
. Note: This outline of evidence is included here for 
the sole purpose of showing that there was a factual basis for 
giving the jury instruction. For a more complete survey of the 
evidence, see Point One, above. 
'. For further discussion of human factors research see 
Point One, above. 
°. A sketch of the intersection is found at Exhibit D. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1.) 
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If the jury believed this version of the evidence, they 
could easily have found "justification or excuse" for Gaw's 
conduct. However, the court's instruction on per se negligence 
failed to give the jury that option. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Gaw sued the truck driver (Lingle) as well as the State of 
Utah. The theory against the State of Utah was that the 
intersection was improperly designed. (R. 511.) 
In the latter stages of the litigation, the State of Utah 
filed a motion for summary judgment. The theory was relatively 
simple. The State of Utah, citing portions of Gaw's deposition, 
stated that she was not confused when she entered the 
intersection.^ The summary judgment was based upon the following 
language in Gaw's deposition: 
y
. Before filing the deposition with the court, Gaw 
clarified that testimony as permitted by Rule 30(e) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In an unusual ruling, the trial court judge 
suppressed the changes. See Order Suppressing Changes to 
Plaintiff's Deposition. (R. 790-791.) 
For a case permitting such deposition changes see Allen and 
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y 197_)\ 
Gaw also filed an affidavit clarifying her testimony. (R. 
109 3.) The trial court likewise suppressed that affidavit. (R. 
1352.) For a case permitting such an affidavit to be filed, see 
Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986); Compare 
Tippens v. Celotex Coip., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1986). 
i 1 
Q. At this time do you have any memory or do you feel that 
you were confused by any of these lines in the 
intersection? 
A. Not that I remember. There was - they didn't ever 
bother me before and I don't remember. 
(Fay Gaw Deposition, p. 81.) 
The trial judge agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the State of Utah. (See Memorandum Decision, R. 1352-1354, 
attached as Exhibit E.) 
However, Gaw also testified in the same deposition that: 
Q. Is there anything about the intersection markings or 
signs that you were unable to understand? 
A. Well, it was always confusing there, the way they had 
lines going that way, this way, and which way. 
Q. What was the confusion? 
A. Well, you really just had to watch what you're doing 
and stay in your lane and watch where your going, 
because they were always marked crazy. 
(Gaw Deposition at p. 59.) 
The trial court should not have taken one comment out of 
context to conclude that Fay Gaw was confused. ^ It is well 
settled that, 
The court's Memorandum Decision states: 
"An examination of the deposition of the 
plaintiff shows that she was not confused by 
any of the lines on the highway or anything 
else at the intersection prior to the 
accident." (R. 1353, attached as Exhibit 
G.) 
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[D]oubts or uncertainties concerning issues 
of fact properly presented or the nature of 
inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to 
be construed in the light most favorable to 
[Gaw]. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah, 
1983") . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, there was expert testimony that Gaw was confused. 
At the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff presented an expert's 
affidavit11 that stated: 
In my opinion, this highway design 
contributed to confusion on the part of Mrs. 
Gaw, and was a contributing cause to the 
accident. 
(R. 1330 attached hereto as Exhibit F.) 
Finally, human nature is such that people who are confused 
usually do not realize that they are confused. At a later 
portion of the trial, the human factors expert testified to what 
should have been self evident to the trial court: 
Q. Another thing, when she testified 
[in the deposition]: "Were you 
confused?" and she said: "No." 
What does that mean to a Human 
Factors Scientist? 
11
. The trial court stated that this affidavit did not have 
a proper foundation, and that the affidavit did not state the 
appropriate standard of conduct. (See Exhibit H.) However, in 
the attached copy, the areas of foundation and standard of care 
are highlighted for the convenience of the Court. (See Exhibit 
I.) The affidavit easily qualifies. Compare American Concepts 
Ins. Co. v. Lochead, 78 Ut. Adv.Rptr. 27, 751 P.2d 271. 
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A. Well, a person can be mislead, in 
which case they're not aware. And 
if they're not aware they're 
mislead, that in that sense, 
they're really not confused -- from 
the standpoint of someone on the 
outside looking at what happened 
and saying: "Well, if she did 
that, it's very likely she was 
confused but didn't know it." You 
see, that's the difference. I'm 
more comfortable with the term 
'misled,' than I am 'confused;' 
because some connotations of the 
word 'confused' would indicate that 
the person was aware that they were 
confused. But -- There's some 
differences between those two 
terms. 
(Tr. 308, Lines 6-19.) 
In summary, the State of Utah was dismissed because of an 
isolated comnient in the deposition that Gaw was not confused. 
However, that statement was taken out of context. Further, it is 
self evident that a person can be misled without knowing it. 
Finally, there is expert testimony in the record that Gaw was 
confused (or misled). 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE TRUCK DRIVER'S DUTY OF DUE CARE 
The judge instructed the jury on the law of the right of 
way.12 However, the instruction is incomplete. Instruction No. 
14 fails to advise the jury of the duty of the favored driver 
See Instruction No. 14, attached as Exhibit A. 
lfi 
(Lingle) to exercise due care. See e.g. Phillips v. Tooele City 
Corp., 500 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1972): 
The emphasis upon the preferred status of 
either driver will not resolve the issue, for 
this right is not absolute, and one who has 
the right of way may not exercise it in the 
face of danger, which one exercising due care 
would see and avoid. 
Even though Lingle was the favored driver, his duty of due 
care was significant for three reasons: First, there was 
evidence that the truck driver (Lingle) was traveling from 70-75 
miles per hour. (Tr. 169, Lines 12-13.) There was further 
evidence of a yellow flashing light (caution) at the 
intersection. (Plaintiff's'Exhibit 45. ) " Finally, there was 
evidence that Gaw was attempting to negotiate a very confusing 
intersection. (Tr. 290, Lines 19-25; 291, Lines 1-10; 292, Lines 
3-8. ) 
Failure to instruct the jury that the favored driver still 
has a duty of due care was prejudicial error. 
DATED this (Jy^ day of ^//Ltlj^ 1989. 
J /[ 
ROBERT JV DE0RY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BY •MmM^^i 
1
^. This is a highway department Photolog. 
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Exhibit A 
INSTRUCTION NO. _[ 
When the law makes it the duty of a driver of one 
vehicle to yield the right of way to a second vehicle, that duty 
arises as soon as the two vehicles are close enough to each other 
to constitute an immediate hazard. Such a hazard exists whenever 
a reasonably prudent person in the position of the driver of the 
first vehicle, would apprehend the probability of colliding with 
the second vehicle if the driver of the first vehicle attempted 
to proceed on the intended course of travel. Failure to yield 
the right of way under such circumstances is negligence. 
* 
Exhibit B 
INSTRUCTION NO. J 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall 
turn onto the roadway being entered, in the extreme left hand 
available lane for traffic moving in the new direction for 
travel. 
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the 
foregoing requirements of the law is negligence on the part of 
the driver. 
i 
Exhibit C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A vehicle may not be operated over, across, or within 
any painted or other dividing space, median or barrier of a 
divided highway if such space or median is clearly visible to a 
reasonably observant person, except where authorized by an 
official traffic control device or peace officer. 
Failure to operate a vehicle in accordance with the 
foregoing requirements of the law is negligence on the part of 
the driver. 
Exhibit D 
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Exhibit E 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C^RT^^uC^B^bffOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAHp^'^'y^''^' ^lyi ^o 
, . ' • - M - Y gL 
FAY GAW, ) 
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) ON MOTIONS FOR 
VS. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ) 
its Department of Transportation,) 
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER, ) 
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois ) 
corporation, and JOHN DOES I ) 
through X, ) Civil No. 14630 
Defendants. ) 
The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary 
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of 
material fact relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action against the State of Utah. The Court 
has received the parties1 Memorandums of Legal Points and 
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the 
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties 
and rules on the State's Motion as hereinafter stated. 
The State defendant has also moved the Court to 
strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It 
would appear to the Court that the plaintiff has not complied 
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District 
Court in submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that 
the plaintiff has filed, but the Court will not strike the 
Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the 
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of 
without that necessity. 
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff 
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the 
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the 
accident. The statements are definite and the Court will not 
allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted 
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no 
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her 
deposition. 
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that 
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without 
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify 
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed 
in this instance. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed 
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at 
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable 
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and 
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff 
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and 
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the 
2 
State is directed to prepare a formal judgment in accordance 
with this opinion. 
The defendants, Lingie and Roadrunner Trucking 
Company, have also made a motion for summary judgment 
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of 
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they 
are entitled to a judgment of no cause of action. 
It would appear to the Court that the first 
affidavit of Mr. Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at 
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that this 
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a 
fact finder. 
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of Lingie and 
Roadrunner for summary judgment and the attorney for the 
plaintiff is instructed to prepare a formal order in accordance 
with this decision. 
DATED this 
• ^ 
day of June, 1988. 
-z&^^/tfy 
D B^JtfNELL,i&tSttlpCT JUDGE 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY. U1AH 
FILED 
HAY 1 2 1303 
DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY GAW, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD 
) ANDERSON 
) Civil No. 14630 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
COMES NOW Howard Anderson, after first being duly 
sworn, deposes and says: 
1. My name is Howard Anderson. My address is 111 
Plantation Drive, Carsen City, Nevada 89701. 
2. I am a licensed engineer and have testified as 
an expert in highway design approximately Q Q times. A copy 
of my curriculum vitae is attached. 
3. I have been asked to review and analyze the 
intersection of Poplar Avenue and Route 6 in Helper, Utah. 
Specifically, I have been asked to analyze the intersection 
NORMAL POCHARD. CLERK 
- J^£^ 
DLPUTY a 
with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6. 
4. I have been provided a diagram of the layout 
of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection. A reduced copy 
of that diagram is attached to this affidavit. I have 
reviewed the police reports and photographs. I have read 
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit. I have reviewed 
the traffic court data consisting of the average daily 
traffic count. These materials are customarily relied upon 
by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an 
intersection. 
5. I do not yet have complete accident data on 
the intersection, and I do not have an hourly count of 
traffic at the intersection. Without an hourly count of 
traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area. 
6. In my opinion, the intersection design for 
drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to 
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design. As a 
result of these failures, the intersection is defective and 
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6. The 
reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
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7. There are three major intersections in Helper. 
They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are 
intersections without active traffic control devices. In 
looking at the traffic movements and the high speed road 
onditions on Route 6, in my opinion, one of the three 
intersections should be signalized (i.e. hve a traffic signal 
installed) . Even if traffic movements on any one of the 
local streets did not meet all the hourly warrants for a 
signal, the signal should be installed because: 
a. A signal would facilitate crossing movements 
at the intersection. For example, a vehicle 
must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the 
stop bar on Poplar Avenue to clear the far 
side of the intersection. This requires a 
long gap in traffic and good judgment on the 
part of the local drivers crossing this 
totally unpatrolled high speed highway. 
b. A signal would inform motorists on Route 6 
that they are entering a community where 
frequent traffic conflicts can be expected. 
c. Most importantly, a signal at any one of the 
Helper intersections would provide traffic 
gaps for the other two intersections. 
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8. The striping and the islands are inadequate 
and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersec-
tion. An infrequent or first-time user can easily be mislead 
into making the wrong decision. Traffic leaving Poplar 
Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or 
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day. At conven-
tional divided highways such as Route 6, that left turn 
movement would be made onto the far side of the median 
(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the 
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly 
next to the through lane. That would be a driver's normal 
expectancy, and the normal intersection design. 
9. I have never seen a four legged intersection 
with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at 
Helper, Utah. Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and 
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route 
6 onto Hill Street. ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street 
at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic 
onto Route 6. 
10. The intersection layout separates traffic 
traveling in the same direction with an island median, while 
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a 
4 
stripe median. This is totally in conflict with normal 
engineering practices. This conflict can and will fail to 
meet reasonable driver expectancy. In my opinion, this 
highway design led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and 
was a contributing cause to the accident. 
11. As a final comment, I have not yet had an 
opportunity to visit the accident scene. My opinions are 
subject to some modification after I make further analysis 
and obtain all the facts. 
of 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /l^h day 
^~fV)(^ r 1988. 
# # - ~ ^ 
*-.v ff 7 V / M#' C<Lm%$S$ E*p: 
NOTARY ^/PUBLIC ^ T^ 
R e s i d i n g a t : ^XcJL^
 {ir-sDj? ff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the_ / # « _day of_ 
o 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by 
depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the 
following: 
Joy Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Doug Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
S~\ 
Howard L. Anderson 
Consulting Engineer 
Highway Safety and Design 
111 Plantation Dr. 
Carson City, Nevada 89701 
DATE OF BIRTH 
October 24, 1921 
EDUCATION 
3940 California School of Aeronautics 
1946-48 University of California at Los Angeles 
1948-49 University of California at Berkeley, B.S. Civil 
Engineering 
1971 Industrial College of Armed Forces 
MILITARY RECORD 
1942-46 Pilot, U.S. Naval Air Corps, Lt. s.g. 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS & SOCIETIES 
Institute of Transportation Engineers 
American Society of Civil Engineers 
Registered Professional Engineer - Alabama 
American Association for Automotive Medicine 
Transportation Research Board 
Commonwealth Club of California - Transportation Section 
National Safety Council 
HONORS 
Superior Achievement Award - Federal Highway Administration 
(DOT) 
Trail Blazer Award - 3M Company 
PUBLICATIONS 
"Teamwork Can Reduce Transportation Accidents", Traffic Safety 
National Safety Council Publication, Jan. 1976. 
"Dispelling a Myth, A Viewpoint on Highway Safety", U.S. 
DeDt. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 
Dec. 1976. 
"Federal Approach to Highway Safety11, U.S. Dept. of Transpor-
tation, Federal Highway Administration, August, 1978. 
"A Final Word on Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 
Federal Highway Administration, Sept., 1°79. 
"The Traffic Engineer and Highway Safety", ITE Journal, 
Nov. 1979. 
PRESENTATIONS TO PROFESSIONAL GROUPS 
"The Future of Transportation in the United States as It 
Effects the Environment", Environmental Conference (Regional) 
Harrisburg, Pa,, May 1971. 
"Highway Design as It Relates to the Environment in Light 
of the Environmental Policy Act", WASHO Conference, San 
Antonio, Texas, June 1971. 
"Environmental Facts for Decision Makers", WASHO Planning 
Conference, OLympia, Washington, July, 1971. 
"Financing the Needs of the Indiana Highway System - The 
Federal Perspective", 61st Annual Road School, Purdue 
University, March, 1975. 
"Motor Carrier Safety Act in Relation to Highway Safety11, 
Private Truck Council, Atlanta, Georgia, April, 1976. 
"Regulatory Reform and Mutual Safety Problems", Government 
Regulations Conference of Truck Week, Chicago, Illinois, 
June, 1976. 
"Safety Problems in Relation to Research and Development 
in the Federal Highway Administration", Western Regional 
Meeting of ATA Council of Safety Supervisors, Jackson, 
Wyoming, July, 1976. 
"Let's Try to Dispel Some Highway Safety Myths", Missouri 
Valley Section of Institute of Transportation Engineers, 
September, 1976. 
"Hazardous Materials, Regulations and Communications", 
Four State Hazardous Materials and Safety Seminar, Kansas 
City, MO., Sept., 1976. 
"Federal Highway Administration Safety Program", National 
Highway Safety Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C., Nov. 
1976. 
"Highway Safety and Human Factor Fallacy", Road Gang, 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 1976. 
"The Price of Progress", ASTA Annual Convention, Orlando, 
Florida, March, 1977. 
"A New Look at Safety", Hawaii Trucking Association, Maka 
ha, Hawaii, Sept. 1977. 
"Construction and Maintenance Zone Safety", 29th Annual 
California Transportation and Public Works Conference, San 
Diego, California, April 1977. 
"Oakland County Challenge", Traffic Improvement Association 
of Oakland County, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, April, 1977. 
"Federal Highway Evaluation of Railroad-Highway Grade Cross-
ing Safety Programs", National Conference on Railroad-High-
way Crossing Safety, University of Utah, August, 1977. 
"Do We Have a Safety Problem on Low Volume Roads?", Trans-
portation Research Board, January, 1978. 
"Work Zone Safety", 57th Annual Meeting of Transportation 
Research Board, January, 1978. 
"Federal Approach to -Safety", 48th Annual Institute of 
Transportation Engineers Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August, 
1978. 
"Safety Problems Today and in the Future", Regional, Federal, 
State and City Employeesrfrom Maryland, Virginia, W. Virginia, 
Delaware and Pennsylvania, Fredricksburg, Virginia, June 
1979. 
"Meaningful Local Traffic Records" - The Real Challenge, 
Fifth National Forum.on Traffic Records, Scottsdale, Arizona. 
July, 1979. f 
"Federally Funded Transportation Programs", 49th Annual 
Meeting of Institute Engineers, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 
1979. 
"Highway Design and Safety Practices11, WASHTO Safety Work-
shop, October, 1979. 
"Safety Challenge for the Future", Am. Society of Civil 
Engineers Specialty Conference on Highway Safety, San 
Diego, CA, March, 1980. 
"Death by Design", Georgia Division, Institute of Trans-
portation Engineers Seminar, Jekyll Island, Georgia, June 
1980. 
"Incompatabilities Between Highway, Vehicles, and Drivers", 
American Association for Automotive Medicine, Rochester, 
New York, October, 1980. 
"Safety and Highway Design Standards", Safety Seminar, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981. 26 Arab nations 
and six western nations represented. 
f,Proven H ^ ^ w ^ y Safety Programs", Safety Seminar - Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, "l9S'l. 
"Why Traffic Records?11', Seventh International Forum on 
Traffic Records Systems, £: Petersburg Beach, Florida, 
July 13-16, 1 9 8 1 / 
"Are Design Standards Strangling Us?", Transportation & 
Traffic Engineering Executive Program, Pennsylvania State 
U n i ve r s it y^ Sep te mb e r 20-25, 1981. 
Testimony before Subcommittee of 0ver sight and Investiga-
tions, House Public Ivorks and Transportation Committee 
on Hi ghway Sa f e t y,. Va sh ington , D C , 0c tober 2 7 , 19 81 
"Truck S a f e tyf f, U n i ve r si t y of Mi ch i g an , Hi g h way Sa f e ty 
Research Insti t u t e , A i i n A r b o r . M i c h i g a n , J a n u a r \ 2 4 - 2 5 ,. 
1982. 
"Antiquity in Highway Design", American Society of Civil 
Engineers Sprin? Convention, Apri1 26-30, 198 2, I ,as Vegas , 
Nevada. 
"The R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C i v i l Engineer in Highway S a f e t y , 
American Society of C i v i l Eng inee r s , New O r l e a n s , Louis iana , 
September 18 -2 l ' 1983, 
1 f
 Work Z o ne T r a f f i c C o nt r o1 - Is sues a nd A i i s we rsf f, A me r i c an 
Cone r e t e P a v e m e n t A s s o c i a t i o n ., N o v ember 16-20, 1985, R e n o , 
Nevada, 
"Accident Records and Tort Liability", Safety Conference for State 
Highway Engineering and Traffic Law Enforcement Officials, February 
8-10, 1987, San Diego, California. 
CAREER EXPERIENCE 
_u-ing ,r.y earl}1 career, . served as structural and 
construction engineer on several bridge and highway 
projects in the western part of the country for the 
Bureau of Public Roads (now FHWA). In 1954, I accepted 
the. position of Division Bridge Engineer for the Bureau 
in Guatemala City, Guatemala, Central America. During 
this four year assignment, I supervised the Guatemalan 
project engineers involved in the construction of the 
'major structures on the Inter-American Highway between 
the Mexican border and Huehuetenango and Guatemala City 
and San Salvador. This process involved not only super-
vision but also training since most: of the Guatemalan 
engineers had 11 111 P or no experience Ln contracting 
procedures. 
In 1958 I returned to California as design- engineer for the 
division office of GHWA in Sacramento. At this time, the 
Interstate Highway program was just getting underway, and 
I worked closely with the State of California Design, 
Traffic and Planning sections in the design and develop-
ment of the San Diego and Golden State Freeways in Los 
Angeles and Interstate Routes 680 and 880 in Northern 
California and the initiation of 1-15 relocation around 
San Bernardino to San Diego, The 1-15 relocation is 
presently under construction after 15 years of R/W and 
environmental studies 
In 1963 I assumed the position of Div ision Administrator 
in Carson City, Nevada. Prior to my tenure in Nevada, the 
state had not designed any urban freeways nor constructed 
any concrete highways in its past. Between 1962 and 1968. 
Interstate 80 design was completed and contracts awarded 
for its construction through Reno, and Interstate 15 was 
designed and constructed through Las Vegas. Nevada also 
started an extensive program of safety upgrading and im-
provement on both the interstate and local road systems. 
in 1963 and 196 5 through a procedure we developed to reduce 
much of the red tape that normally existed in this type 
of work. 
In 1969 I became Design Engineer for the Region in San 
Francisco which included the states of California, Nevada, 
Arizona and Hawaii, and in this capacity, for two years, 
I was able to influence the adoption of more liberal design 
and safety standards in all of these sta-tes. One example 
of this is the adoption by all of the states in 1969 of the 
Concrete Median Barrier and the installation of attenuators 
o n a 1 1 g o re ar sas t h at wer e o n ne v1y cons t r u ct e d st ruc t ures. 
j ^acj t^e opportunity in 1971 to broaden my experience and 
accepted a position in the Washington headquarters office 
as Division Chief of the Environment and Design Research 
Division in the Office of Research. In this capacity, I 
supervised approximately 35 research engineers, many with 
advanced degrees in engineering, physics, hydraulics and 
economics. We initiated research into the. accommodation 
of the 80,000 pound truck on the Interstate and got 
deeply involved in air, water, and noise pollution studies. 
Promotion to the Director of the Office of Development 
followed in 1972 and in the supervision of the 60 pro-
fessionals in the office, we reorganized the personnel to 
be more responsive to the needs of the field offices 
and state highway departments. An Implementation Division 
was established to work closely with the field offices and 
to screen recent research results to determine how best to 
get new technology into use. Training courses in noise 
and air pollution were developed. A contract was awarded 
to develop a guide for designing traffic barriers. T"I: ;is 
guide has since been adopted by AASHT0 as basic policy. 
Testing of small sign supports was undertaken and has 
resulted in the prohibition of 3" pipe and back to back 
tPposts for small sign supports* further modification of 
sign supports are expected,, in the future 
In May of 1974, I became Regional Administrator of the 
Great Lakes States, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In this capacity I supervised 
approximately 250 personnel, largely engineers with a 
sprinkling of auditors, architects, and administrative 
people. In 1974 and 1975 we initiated a thorough review 
of safety practices and use of accident data in both the 
state highway departments and within the Bureau of Motor 
Carrier Safety which controls the safety of operation of 
Interstate and foreign motor carriers. As a result of 
findings of the review, we established and entity within 
each state to devote full time and become a focal point 
for*action in improving the safety practices and policies 
of both the local and state highway agencies and the 
internal operation of the Federal Highway Administrate:>n, 
A counterpart was also established at regional level. To 
make room for these safety personnel, a number of positions 
were abolished because the changing scope (less R/W work, 
for example) of the highway program made them excess. 
In 19? 5 , a pro mo11o n to Washington, D . C . , a s t h e f i rs t 
Associate Administrator for Safety was accepted.. The 
office consisted of two main areas nf responsibility. 
One vas the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety which involved 
supervising 60 headquarters personnel dealing with the 
promulgation of research and regulations in the safety 
of motor carriers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and 
the transport of hazardous materia 1 s T1: Ie o ther r espons i -
bility was the highway safety standards an i the safety 
construction program of FHWA. 
In the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety area, we reorganized 
the 123 investigators under the direction of an Officer 
in Charge in each state, delegated additional responsibility 
to the field in settling civil- forfeiture, and undertook 
a vigorous research program into heavy vehicle operations 
and started strike force activities in enforcement inspec-
tions . 
T
 n i "h e_ fc i gVjv 2 y s a f e r y standards area, w e i rnpr o v e d w o r k i n g 
relationships with the Natio n a 1 H ig hw ay Traffic S a f e t y 
Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board 
as well as union and citizen safety groups. The Office of 
Safety asserted its role in developing programs of research 
to meet the future safety needs of the states and the 
Federal Highway Administration. Typical of these programs 
was a stepped up research program to accommodate the heavy 
vehicel on our highway system and a program to develop safer 
guardrails and bridge rails for both the 1800 lb. car of 
the future and the school bus size vehicles. 
Studies were undertaken to indicate the need for safety 
engineers in our field offices. As a result of this push, 
FHWA now has safer y pro g r am engineers i n vi r t u a 11y e ver) 
•state * n t h e c o u n t r y . 
On Julv 1 0, 19 79, after completing 30 years of service 
with TlrMA I retired. 
GUEST i ECU mm. 
Pen nsy1vani a Stat e U n i ve r si ty • 1 9 8 J 
University, of Michigan *i,^x 
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grants the Motion for Summary Judqment and the attorney for the 
State Is directed to prepare a formal judgment I t accordance 
with this opi nion. 
The deienaants, Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking 
Company, have also made a motion for summary judgment 
f 
luuuridl fac: GMO tun. i>a^*j^ uAiii th';..-*-- .nci;routed [acts they 
::e entitled to a judgment* if ^ --aur^  --f n ^* -on. 
affidavit o: L\. Beaufort, whicn the co-.;rt *- . I no: strike at 
tM^ -. : me, coer e^t^b'lirh sufficient issues of fact that this 
;
^ tp rn i inc j \ : on bv a 
j.. Q .. .. : P. : 
Therefore -
Roadrunner for summary 
plainti f f is instruct. 
w 
DATED this 
judgment a..J ^..-= attOiuev 
prepare a formal order accordance 
~>^f 
dav of Tune. 1988 
~cr 
D BUNNELL, i M S T ^ I C T JUDGE / 
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1
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FAY GAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Department of Transportation,] 
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER, ] 
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, and JOHN DOES I \ 
through X, 
Defendants. 
• ' " ' ' C-
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 ON MOTIONS FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 14630 
The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary 
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of 
material fact relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action against the State of Utah. The Court 
has received the parties1 Memorandums of Legal Points and 
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the 
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties 
and rules on the State's Motion as hereinafter stated. 
The State defendant has also moved the Court to 
strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It 
would appear to the Court that the plaintiff has not complied 
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District 
Court in submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that 
the plaintiff has filed, but the Court will not strike the 
Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the 
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of 
without that necessity. 
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff 
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the 
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the 
accident. The statements are definite and the Court will not 
allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted 
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no 
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her 
deposition. 
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that 
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without 
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify 
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed 
in this instance. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed 
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at 
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable 
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and 
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff 
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and 
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the 
2 
State is directed to prepare a formal judgment in accordance 
with this opinion. 
The defendants, Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking 
Company, have also made a motion for summary judgment 
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of 
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they 
are entitled to a judgment of no cause of action. 
It would appear to the Court that the first 
affidavit of Mr. Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at 
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that this 
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a 
fact finder. 
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of Lingle and 
Roadrunner for summary judgment and the attorney for the 
plaintiff is instructed to prepare a formal order in accordance 
with this decision. 
DATED this /T <Z day of June, 1988. 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY. U1AH 
F I L E D 
HAT 12 1383 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor 
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Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY GAW, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v s . • . • • ] 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. ] 
Defendants. 
| AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD | ANDERSON 
) Civil No. 14630 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
COMES NOW Howard Anderson, after first being duly 
sworn, deposes and says: 
1. My name is Howard Anderson. My address is 111 
Plantation Drive, Carsen City, Nevada 89701. 
2. I am a licensed engineer and have testified as 
an expert in highway design approximately o p times. A copy 
of my curriculum vitae is attached. 
3. I have been asked to review and analyze the 
intersection of Poplar Avenue and Route 6 in Helper, Utah. 
Specifically, I have been asked to analyze the intersection 
KORMA^PRjCHARD. CLERK 
DLPU7Y O 
»fl££> •ftf 
with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6 . N ' ^ ' . 
4. I have been provided a diagram of the layout 
of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection. A reduced copy 
of that diagram is attached to this affidavit. I have 
reviewed the police reports and photographs. I have read 
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit. I have reviewed 
the traffic court data consisting of the average daily 
traffic count. These materials are customarily relied upon 
by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an 
intersection. 
5. I do not yet have complete accident data on 
the intersection, and I do not have an hourly count of 
traffic at the intersection. Without an hourly count of 
traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area. 
6. In my opinion, the intersection design for 
drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to 
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design. As a 
result of these failures, the intersection is defective and 
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6. The 
reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
2 
7. There are three major intersections in Helper. 
They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are 
intersections without active traffic control devices. In 
looking at the traffic movements and the high speed road 
onditions on Route 6, in my opinion, one of the three 
intersections should be signalized (i.e. hve a traffic signal 
installed) . Even if traffic movements on any one of the 
local streets did not meet all the hourly warrants for a 
signal, the signal should be installed because: 
a. A signal would facilitate crossing movements 
at the intersection. For example, a vehicle 
must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the 
stop bar on Poplar Avenue to clear the far 
side of the intersection. This requires a 
long gap in traffic and good judgment on the 
part of the local drivers crossing this 
totally unpatrolled high speed highway. 
b. A signal would inform motorists on Route 6 
that they are entering a community where 
frequent traffic conflicts can be expected. 
c. Most importantly, a signal at any one of the 
Helper intersections would provide traffic 
gaps for the other two intersections. 
3 
8. The striping and the islands are inadequate 
and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersec-
tion. An iri'requent or first-time user can easily be mislead 
into making the wrong decision. Traffic leaving Poplar 
Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or 
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day. At conven-
tional divided highways such as Route 6, that left turn 
movement would be made onto the far side of the median 
(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the 
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly 
next to the through lane. That would be a driver's normal 
expectancy, and the normal intersection design. 
9. I have never seen a four legged intersection 
with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at 
Helper, Utah. Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto 
Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and 
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route 
6 onto Hill Street. ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street 
at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic 
onto Route 6. 
10. The intersection layout separates traffic 
traveling in the same direction with an island median, while 
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a 
4 
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stripe median. This is totally in conflict with normal 
engineering practices. This conflict can and will fail to 
meet reasonable driver expectancy. In my opinion, this 
highway design led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and 
was a contributing cause to the accident. 
11. As a final comment, I have not yet had an 
opportunity to visit the accident scene. My opinions are 
subject to some modification after I make further analysis 
and obtain all the facts. 
of 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 
^-fY)Cuj , 1988. 
> ^ 
/ < > > 
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HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by 
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Joy Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Clifford C. Ross 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Doug Bayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Howard L. Anderson 
Consulting Engineer 
Highway Safety and Design 
111 Plantation Dr. 
Carson City, Nevada 89701 
DATE OF BIRTH 
October 24, 1921 
EDUCATION 
3940 California School of Aeronautics 
1946-48 University of California at Los Angeles 
1948-49 University of California at Berkeley, B.S. Civil 
Engineering 
1971 Industrial College of Armed Forces 
MILITARY RECORD 
1942-46 Pilot, U.S. Naval Air Corps, Lt. s.g. 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS & SOCIETIES 
Institute of Transportation Engineers 
American Society of Civil Engineers 
Registered Professional Engineer - Alabama 
American Association for Automotive .Medicine 
Transportation Research Board 
Commonwealth Club of California - Transportation Section 
National Safety Council 
HONORS 
Superior Achievement Award - Federal Highway Administration 
(DOT) 
Trail Blazer Award - 3M Company 
PUBLICATIONS 
MTeamwork Can Reduce Transportation Accidents", Traffic Safety 
National Safety Council Publication, Jan. 1976. 
''Dispelling a Myth, A Viewpoint on Highway Safety", U.S. 
Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 
Dec. 1976. 
"Federal Approach to Highway Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transpor-
tation, Federal Highway Administration, August, 1978. 
"A Final Word on Safety", U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 
Federal Highway Administration, Sept., 1979. 
"The Traffic Engineer and Highway Safety", ITE Journal, 
Nov. 1979. 
PRESENTATIONS TO PROFESSIONAL GROUPS 
"The Future of Transportation in the United States as It 
Effects the Environment", Environmental Conference (Regional) 
Harrisburg, Pa., May 1971. 
"Highway Design as It Relates to the Environment in Light 
of the Environmental Policy Act", WASHO Conference, San 
Antonio, Texas, June 1971. 
"Environmental Facts for Decision Makers", WASHO Planning 
Conference, OLympia, Washington, July, 1971. 
"Financing the Needs of the Indiana Highway System - The 
Federal Perspective", 61st Annual Road School, Purdue 
University, March, 1975. 
"Motor Carrier Safety Act in Relation to Highway Safety", 
Private Truck Council, Atlanta, Georgia, April, 1976. 
"Regulatory Reform and Mutual Safety Problems", Government 
Regulations Conference of Truck Week, Chicago, Illinois, 
June, 1976. 
"Safety Problems in Relation to Research and Development 
in the Federal Highway Administration", Western Regional 
Meeting of ATA Council of Safety Supervisors, Jackson, 
Wyoming, July, 1976. 
"Let's Try to Dispel Some Highway Safety Myths'1, Missouri 
Valley Section of Institute of Transportation Engineers, 
September, 1976. 
"Hazardous Materials, Regulations and Communications", 
Four State Hazardous Materials and Safety Seminar, Kansas 
City, MO., Sept., 1976. 
"Federal Highway Administration Safety Program", National 
Highway Safety Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C, Nov. 
1976. 
"Highway Safety and Human Factor Fallacy", Road Gang, 
Washington, D.C, Nov. 1976. 
"The Price of Progress", ASTA Annual Convention, Orlando, 
Florida, March, 1977. 
"A New Look at Safety", Hawaii Trucking Association, Maka 
ha, Hawaii, Sept. 1977. 
"Construction and Maintenance Zone Safety", 29th Annual 
California Transportation and Public Works Conference, San 
Diego, California, April 1977. 
"Oakland County Challenge", Traffic Improvement Association 
of Oakland County, Bloornfield Hills, Michigan, April, 1977. 
"Federal Highway Evaluation of Railroad-Highway Grade Cross-
ing Safety Programs", National Conference on Railroad-High-
way Crossing Safety, University of Utah, August, 1977. 
"Do We Have a Safety Problem on Low Volume Roads?", Trans-
portation' Research Board, January, 1978. 
"Work Zone Safety", 57th Annual Meeting of Transportation 
Research Board, January, 1978. 
"Federal Approach to -Safety", 48th Annual Institute of 
Transportation Engineers Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August, 
1978. 
"Safety Problems Today and in the Future", Regional, Federal, 
State and City Employeesrfrom Maryland, Virginia, W. Virginia, 
Delaware and Pennsylvania, Fredricksburg, Virginia, June 
1979. 
"Meaningful Local Traffic Records" - The Real Challenge, 
Fifth National Forum on Traffic Records, Scottsdale,.Arizona. 
July, 1979. f 
"Federally Funded Transportation Programs", 49th Annual 
Meeting of Institute Engineers, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 
1979. 
"Highway Design and Safety Practices", WASHTO Safety Work-
shop, October, 1979. 
"Safety Challenge for the Future", Am. Society of Civil 
Engineers Specialty Conference on Highway Safety, San 
Diego, CA, March, 1980. 
"Death by Design", Georgia Division, Institute of Trans-
portation Engineers Seminar, Jekyll Island, Georgia, June 
1980. 
"Incompatabilities Between Highway, Vehicles, and Drivers", 
American Association for Automotive Medicine, Rochester, 
New York, October, 1980. 
"Safety and Highway Design Standards", Safety Seminar, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981. 26 Arab nations 
and six western nations represented. 
"Proven K*>gvw*v Safety Programs", Safety Seminar - Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, April 18-21, 1981. 
"Why Traffic Records?", Seventh International Forum on 
Traffic Records Systems, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida, 
July 13-16, 1981/ 
"Are Design Standards Strangling Us?", Transportation & 
Traffic Engineering Executive Program, Pennsylvania State 
University, September 20-25, 1981. 
Testimony before Subcommittee of Oversight and Investiga-
tions, House Public Works and Transportation Committee 
on Highway Safety,. Washington, D.C.", October 27, 1981. 
"Truck Safety", University of Michigan, Highway Safety 
Research Institute, Ann Arbor- Michigan, Januarv 24-25, 
1982. 
"Antiquity in Highway Design", American Society of Civil 
Engineers Spring Convention, April 26-30, 1982, Las Vegas, 
Nevada. 
"The Responsibility of the Civil Engineer in Highway Safety, 
American Society of Civil Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
September 19-21, 1983. 
"Work Zone Traffic Control - Issues and Answers", American 
Concrete Pavement Association, November 16-20, 1985, Reno, 
Nevada. 
"Accident Records and Tort Liability", Safety Conference for State 
Highway Engineering and Traffic Law Enforcement Officials, February 
8-10, 1987, San Diego, California. 
CAREER EXPERIENCE 
During my early career, I served as structural and 
construction engineer on several bridge and highway 
projects in the western part of the country for the 
Bureau of Public Roads (now FHWA). In 1954, I *crepted 
the position of Division Bridge Engineer for the Bureau 
in Guatemala City, Guatemala, Central America, During 
this four year assignment, I supervised the Guatemalan 
project engineers involved in the construction of the 
major structures on the Inter-American Highway between 
the Mexican border and Huehuetenango and Guatemala City 
and San Salvador- This process involved not only super-
vision but also training since most of the Guatemalan 
engineers had little or no experience in contracting 
procedures. 
In 195B I returned to California as design engineer for the 
division office of GHWA in Sacramento. At this time, the 
Interstate Highway program was just getting underway, and 
I worked closely with the State of California Design, 
Traffic and Planning sections in the design and develop-
ment of the San Diego and Golden State Freeways in Los 
Angeles and Interstate Routes 680 and 880 in Northern 
California and the initiation of 1-15 relocation around 
San Bernardino to San Diego. The 1-15 relocation is 
presently under construction after 15 years of R/W and 
environmental studies. 
In 1963 I assumed the position of Division Administrator 
in Carson City, Nevada. Prior to my tenure in Nevada, the 
state had not designed any urban freeways nor constructed 
any concrete highways in its past. Between 1962 and 1968 
Interstate 80 design was completed and contracts awarded 
for its construction through Reno, and Interstate 15 was 
designed and constructed through Las Vegas. Nevada also 
started an extensive program of safety upgrading and im-
provement on both the interstate and local road systems. 
in 1963 and 1965 through a procedure we developed to reduce 
much of the red tape that normally existed in this type 
of work. 
In 1969 I became Design Engineer for the Region in San 
Francisco which included the states of California, Nevada, 
Arizona and Hawaii, and in this capacity, for two years, 
I was able to influence the adoption of more liberal design 
and safety standards in all of these sta-tes. One example 
of this is the adoption by all of the states in 1969 of the 
Concrete Median Barrier and the installation of attenuators 
on all gore areas that were on newly constructed structures. 
I had the opportunity in 1971 to broaden my experience and 
accepted a position in the Washington headquarters office 
as Division Chief of the Environment and Design Research 
Division in the Office of Research. In this capacity, I 
supervised approximately 35 research engineers, many with 
advanced degrees in engineering, physics, hydraulics and 
economics. We initiated research into the. accommodation 
of the 8C,000 pound truck on the Interstate and got 
deeply involved in air, water, and noise pollution studies. 
Promotion to the Director of the Office of Development 
followed in 1972 and in. the supervision of the 60 pro-
fessionals in the office, we reorganized the personnel to 
be more responsive to the needs of the field offices 
and state highway departments. An Implementation Division 
was established to work closely with the field offices and 
to screen recent research results to determine how best to 
get new technology into use. Training courses in noise 
and air pollution were developed. A contract was awarded 
to develop a guide for designing traffic barriers. This 
guide has since been adopted by AASHTO as basic policy. 
Testing of small sign supports was undertaken ard has . 
resulted in the prohibition of 3" pipe and back to back 
IFposts for small sign supports. Further modification of 
sign supports are expected in the future. 
In May of 1974, I became Regional Administrator of the 
Great Lakes States, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In this capacity I supervised 
approximately 250 personnel, largely engineers with a 
sprinkling of auditors, architects, and administrative 
people. In 1974 and 1975 we initiated a thorough review 
of safety practices and use of accident data in both the 
state highway departments and within the Bureau of Motor 
Carrier Safety which controls the safety of operation of 
Interstate and foreign motor carriers. As a result of 
findings of the review, we established and entity within 
each state to devote full time and become a focal point 
for action in improving the safety practices and policies 
of both the local and state highway agencies and the 
internal operation of the Federal Highway Administration. 
A counterpart was also established at regional level. To 
make room for these safety personnel, a number of positions 
were abolished because the changing scope (less R/W work, 
for example) of the highway program made them excess. 
In 1975, a promotion to Washington, D.C., as the first 
Associate Administrator for Safety was accepted. . The 
office consisted of two main areas of responsibility. 
One was the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety which involved 
supervising 60 headquarters personnel dealing with the 
promulgation of research and regulations in the safety 
of motor carriers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and 
the transport of hazardous materials. The other responsi-
bility was the highway safety standards and the safety 
construction program of FHWA. 
In the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety area, we reorganized 
the 123 investigators under the direction of an Officer 
in Charge in each state, delegated additional responsibility 
to the field in settling civil forfeiture, and undertook 
a vigorous research program into heavy vehicle operations 
and started strike force activities in enforcement inspec-
tions. 
In the highway safety standards area, we improved working 
relationships with the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board 
as well as union and citizen safety groups. The Office of 
Safety asserted its role in developing programs of research 
to meet the future safety needs of the states and the 
Federal Highway Administration. Typical of these programs 
was a stepped up research program to accommodate the heavy 
vehicel on our highway system and a program to develop safer 
guardrails and bridge rails for both'the 1800 lb. car of 
the future and the school bus size vehicles. 
Studies were undertaken to indicate the need for safety 
engineers in our field offices. As a result of this push, 
FHWA now has safety program engineers in virtually every 
state *n the country. 
On Julv 10, 1979, after completing 30 years of service 
with FHWA. I retired. 
GUEST LECTURER 
Pennsylvania State University - 1981 
University, of Michigan - 1981 
